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IN I~EJ:~: STJPREME COUR/r OF 'I1iiD b$T'PArrr.·. OF ·ur~ .t,.B 
HOLLl-.~· E.:. W.t\LKEI1:., ) 
f··1aintiff & I~-e.spond.·-~-nt : 
vs. 
LEVI G. PET'ERSD 
Defendant & Appellatit. 
) 
. 
• ) 
: 
) 
Additional Argument 
and . the,matieal 
Computations by 
App ·····llt~·l111t 
.l'l<' ·· .. J.;,;J .· ~ · 
Case No. 821S 
To eom.pute acceleration according to the rate ,provided 
for in Section 41·8-144 of BeW.sed .statutes .of Utah 196:j 
for deceleration, it would m::.~a.n thiS: That if we were in a 
ear ready to drive forwa:rd and them drove forward a 
distance o1148 feet, and durinq that time we ae·eel~~rated 
it at th;~ rate the statute calls for, of 14 feet per second 
per a.econd, we would then b-t gcirtCJ the rate per hour that 
thd sSJne ear would be qotnq if he decided to tl:'t:£~n stop artd 
consequ-~ntly put on his brakes so as to d~elerate it at the 
rate cf 14 feet per seeonc! per aeeond and was able to stop 
1n a distance of 148 feet. 
The reason why I wish to shoW this c~tation ia 
this: The plaintiff slid his wheels anci left tire n1arks of 
148 feet prior to the impact. Ee then went forward an 
additional 42 feet and in. addition knocked a Mereuy 
automobil~ 72 fec~t baek ·up the road. Now, if I compute 
hls spee4 on an usum.ecl basis of him actually stoppinq in 
148 feet and not 19·0 feet wbieh l1e traveled, and also not 
WEf into eonsider~tion the. s~eed that, w~d have to be 
to it to carey him on. anoth.:·r 42 .1,.ee-c and knock the 
Mercury 72 feet. rrhen with tl1at inforrn.ation, it ·would 'be 
easier to determine if tl1e ap·eed of the plaintiff in hiS 
Cadillac car was a factor and proximate CIUlae of tl1e· 
aectd.ent. 
F-1 LED 
(11a) 
-- ·-----. • .- .... --~ ......... .,.,,.....f 
-----.:~-,-e~!~. St-'f'H~.tr.t~ Cot.t,.t~ Utah 
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~Dr. Illillip 1. fJ .. att, the pb1·s1ei.st at tll·~ S-tate 
r. f\qrieultural Coll':.,.CJ€ 1 hu giV€li. m;e this formula: 
~ a or acceleration .. 1 ~!· feet pii'r~ seeoaa per s~(eo.nd. 
1 • distance to travel er 148 :t~!<::t 
v ... velocity at 143 feet., 
i~ORMt1LJ\, ~ - ~1a:; 
'-v lu 
1~;4.)544 
121s ttfloo 
) 38·40 
I ·&ltiil!li I( 
sa 
If the plaintiff rl&d stopp~~d at 148 feet without 
ltrW.nq any object and did ao in the r~ui~e.:a1snts ~~;; tb.e 
statute, his speed. before comn.l.eneinq to stop was ~~~~i:. 8 
mU~s pi!tr hour in a 40 :mile· so11e. 
/11"h\ 
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~·U \Ia- f)II:O·. . ;ft ,~·· Me··~· :a ~~-lli.·a, tGid .. ... ~~!.!\ ~g t:lUW' 
..s.· rtY 
Respectfully submitted, 
\}Jalter G. Mann 
Attorney for Defendant & P~ppellant. 
(llc) 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
S'TATE OF U'TAH 
GLEN A. HATCH and EDITH E. , 
HATCH, 
Plaintiffs and Appella.nts) 
-vs.-
W. S. HAT'CH COMPANY, a corpo-
ration and WILLARD S. HATCH, 
DefendaJY~;ts arnd Respondewts. 
Case No. 8215 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an action brought by the plaintiff, appellants 
herein, to enjoin or abate a private nuisance in the use 
by the defendants, respondents herein, of their lands 
adjoining plaintiff's property on the north and east there-
of, and for other relief. This action was brought under 
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the authority of Section 78-38-1, Utah Code Annotated, 
1953, which is as follows: 
"78-38-1. 'NUISANCE' DEFINED -RIGHT 
OF' ACTION F'OR JUDG~fENT. - Anything 
which is injurious to health, or indecent, or offen-
sive to the senses, or an obstruction to the free use 
of property, so as to interfere with the comfortable 
enjoyment of life or pr'Operty, is a nuisance and 
the subject of an action. Such action may be 
brought by any p,erson whose property is injuri-
ously affeeted, or whose personal enjoyment is 
lessened by nuisanee; and by the judgment the 
nuisance may be enjoined or[ahated], and darn-
ages may also be recovered." 
The cause ca1ne on for trial before the Honorable 
Parley E. N orseth, Judge of the Second Judical Court, 
sitting \vithout a jury, at Davis County, State of Utah. 
The eourt entered findings of fact, conclusions of law 
and decree in favor of defendants and against plaintiffs, 
finding that no actionable nuisance existed, and dis-
missed p~laintiffs' eon1plaint with prejudice. This appeal 
is taken fron1 said decree. 
The facts show that the plain tiffs are o'vners of 
certain residential and farm prop·erty located in Woods 
Cross, Davis County, Utah, approxilnately 610 feet South 
of the intersection of 5th South and 8th vVest Streets. 
The W. S. Hatch Co. is a corporation of the State of 
Utah, and W. S. Hatch is the president and manager 
of the said corporation. The corporation owns or leases 
land whieh adjoins the plaintiffs' property on the north 
and east thereof. Up until about 1951, defendant~' only 
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had land that adjoined plaintiffs' property on the north, 
but at that time they leased the property which adjoins 
plaintiffs' property ·on the east from Phillips PPtroleunl 
Company, the owners thereof. Defendant~ conduct, both 
upon the leased property and their ovvn property, a road 
and fuel oil and acid tranportation and distribution busi-
ness. Defendants run over 30 large units on this property 
and use it f.or the maintenance, repairing, servic!ng·, 
cleaning, starting and storing of the:<e large trucks, seuti-
trucks and trailers used for the transportation ·of oil and 
acid. 
The plaintiffs cornplained that defendants, in the 
conduct of their business and in the maintenance, re-
pairing, cleaning, starting and servicing of these trucks, 
have caused and are causing, both day and night, loud 
and unusual noises, to-wit: hanunering metal upon metal 
parts of trucks, tires and other objects while n1aintaining 
equipment and making repairs, changing tires and for 
other purposes. It was also compla.jned that defendants, 
in the cleaning and greasing of their equiprnent, cause 
loud noises like hissing and squealing over a prolonged 
period of time and that they cause loud noises in starting, 
testing, and warrning up the engines of the various 
trucks and tractors; and that they drive the said trucks 
and tractors into and around the area without regard 
to the noise rnade thereby and idle the engines of the 
said trucks and tractors for prolongc·d periods of ti1ne 
\Vith the throttle open so as to n1ake a large an1ount of 
noise. Plaintiffs further co1nplainPd that the lights used 
at night in the business are ·so located r.nd are of ~~ueh an 
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intensity that the light therefrom shines directly upon 
and into the premises of the plaintiffs, especially into 
the the bedroom of plaintiffs, resulting in loss of sleep 
be~ause of the glare. It was further complained that 
the defendant's. operation causes fumes of oil and exhaust 
to enter plaintiffs' p·rop·erty creating an extremely un-
pleasant condition and tending to 1nake plaintiffs' hon1e 
uninhabitable. Defendants were further complained of 
for the reason that they put old tires, batteries, stoves, 
metal and concrete refuse, etc., along the fence separa t-
ing plainti'ffs' and defendants' property, thus constituting 
an eyesore and fire hazard. Plaintiffs contended and do 
contend that each and all of the above conditions con-
stituted actionable nuisances under Section 78-38-1, Utah 
Code Annotated, 1953, and also under the recognized 
law of nuisance as it exists in this. state. 
The facts show that plaintiffs' home was orginally 
constructed about 80 years ago and that plaintiff Glen 
A. Hatch was born in the home and lived there until 
five or six years of ·age "\Vhen he moved into the home 
now ·occupied by his brother, Willard S. Hatch, and that 
he lived in that ho1ne until he was 1narried in 1917 when 
he moved hack into his present hon1e. The home \Va~ 
remodeled a tin1e or two and very extensively remodeled 
in 1951. Plaintiffs' ho1ne and that home occupied by 
defendant Willard S. Hatch, have al,vays been used 
solely for residential purposes. 
When the plaintiffs moved into their home after 
their marri~age in 1917, the property in the en tire \~V oods 
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Cross area 'vas used for residential and farming pur-
poses with the exception of the railroad located in front 
of their residence and one industry consisting of a cor-
rugated pipe and headgate business located at the north-
east corner of Fifth South and Eighth vVest Ntreet~ 
about an eighth of a mile from plaintiffs' home. (R-5,6) 
There were also a small garage and t\YO stores in the 
area. About 1925 the vVasatch Oil Conlpany, predece!SS'Or 
in interest to the Phillips P·etroleum Cornpany, pur:chased 
the Hardesty Manufacturing Con1pany building and 
so1netirne thereafter started their refining operations 
there. ( R-7) Since that tiine other conunerc1a1 cons truc-
tion has corne into the area, consisting of the Phillips 
loading doek, warehouse and storage building; a new 
Phillips loading dock; the Mitchell (}ara.ge; the Drouba.y 
G-arage; and the large e:xpansion of the Pl1il1ips plant 
north of Fifth ·South Street. ( R-8, et seq) 
At the present tirne the area 1nay he described 
thusly: 
Proceeding east from the intersection of Fifth South 
and Eighth West Streets, on the north side of Fifth 
South Street, there are located the railroad station, 
the Hatch Brothers office building, forrnerly occupied as 
a bank, and six or seven residence and farrns which are 
west of the present Farrners' Hta.te Bank Building which 
is just vvest of Highway 91. On the opposite side of 
the street proceeding west fron1 Iiighvvay 91, there is 
a service garage at the intersection of I-Iigh\vay 91 and 
Fifth South, then nothing hut residences and farrus do\vn 
to the Drouhay garage, west of \vhich are loeated a 
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residence, a buil\ding, part of the Phillips operation, and 
the Post ·Offic.e Building, respectively. Proceeding west' 
from the intersection of F'ifth South and Eighth West on 
the south side of the street there are no businesses and 
·property i~s used entirely for residenti~al and farming pur-
poses. This is true ·on both sides of Eighth West Street, 
south of plaintiffs' residence, for a quarter of a mile. 
At this point there is located a small display room for 
showing boats. Further, the area to the east of the pro-
perty leased from Phillips by the defendants is all used 
for farming purposes, there being no business located 
east thereof up· to the businesses located on Highway 
91. The building north of the vVillard S. Hatch residence 
occupied by W. S. Hatch Company and now used by S'aid 
company as an office building \vas formerly a grocery 
and general store building. To the north of Fifth South 
Street on either side of Eighth West is the Phillips 
Petroleum operation. (Defendants' Exhibits 1 and 6, 
R-8, et seq) 
The defendant Willard S. Hatch started his business 
in about 1937 or 1938 with one small unit that he parked 
in his barn or hay shed. He used this one unit a year 
or two, and then he acquired another one and entered 
into the business of transporting fuel oil. (R-179) At 
the end of 1951 he had acquired 23 pieces of equipment. 
In the year 1952 he acquired 13 additional units, and in 
1953, 10 more, thereby doubling his equip1nent during 
the year of 1952 and 1953; in addition he follovvs the 
practice of leasing certain equip·ment. (R-138, 139) In 
1952 and again in 1953, defendants substantially ex-
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7 
panded their work shop, which expansions were rnade 
after the acquisition by lease frorn the Phillips Petroluern 
Con1pany of a large section of property behind the then 
exisi ting operation. ( R-190) 
It was after this expansion cornn1enced, that is, after 
1951, that the defendants expanded their business until 
it became a 24 hour operation during the bu~y season, 
(R-17) the busy season starting along in April and eon-
tinning until November. (R-26) The increased ntunber 
of trucks and equipment which frequented the defend-
ants' premises and the increased \vork upon the equip-
rnent which resulted in a round-the-clock operation and 
in a greatly increased use of lights, running of engines, 
noise, etc., forced the plaintiffs to protest, first to the 
defendants and finally in a court of law. 
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STATEMENT OF POINT'S 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN MAKING ITS FIND-
INGS OF FACT IN THAT SAID FINDINGS AND CONCLU-
SIONS WERE NOT BASED UPON THE EVIDENCE AND 
WERE CONTRARY TO THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT NO 
NUISANCE EXISTS OR EXISTED, WHICH ERROR vV AS 
BASED UPON A MISCONCEPTION OF THE LAW AND A 
MISINTERPRETATION O·F THE FACTS AS BROUGHT OUT 
BY THE EVIDENCE; AND THEREFORE THE TRIAL 
COURT FURTHER ERRED IN FAILING TO GRANT 
APPELLANTS INJUNCTIVE RELIEF. 
POIN·T III 
IF THIS CO·UR.T SHOULD FIND AN ACTIONABLE 
NUISANCE DOES EXIS'T BUT FINDS FURTHER THAT 
APPELLANTS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO EQUITABLE RE-
LIEF IN THE FO~RM OF AN INJUNCTIO·N, IT IS RESPECT-
FULLY SUBMITTED THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED 
IN REJECTING CERTAIN EVIDENCE AS TO DAMAGES 
AND THE CASE SHOULD BE REMANDED TO THE 
LOWER COURT TO PERMIT A FINDING AS TO THE, 
AMOUNT OF DAMAGES TO WHICH APPELLANTS ARE 
ENTITLED. 
A. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN, AT PAGE 
31 OF THE RECORD, IT SUSTAINED AN OBJEC-
TION TO A QUESTION PUT BY APPELLANTS' 
·COUNSEL TO APPELLANT GLEN A. HATCH, 
WHICH QUESTION WAS DESIGNED TO ELICIT 
TESTIMONY RELATIVE TO THE VALUE OF THE 
APPELLANTS' PROPERTY. 
B. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN, AT PAGE 
70 OF THE RECORD, IT SUSTAINED A MOTION 
TO STRIKE ALL OF THE TESTIMONY OF THE 
APPELLANTS' EXPERT WITNESS LARSON. 
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ARG1JMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN- MAKING ITS FIND-
INGS OF FACT IN THAT SAID FINDINGS AND CONCLU-
SIONS WERE NOT BASED UPON THE EVIDENCE AND 
WERE CONTRARY. TO THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE" 
It is the appellants' contention that the findings of 
fact do not truly represent the situation as it exists· or 
existed at the tin1e of the trial. It is con tended that s-aid 
findings tend either to minimize absurdly or ignore to-
tally certain facts which are, to say the least, pertinent 
to any inquiry into the existence of a nuisance. Further, 
there are other findings of fact couched in terrns "\Vhich 
rnisrepresent or distort the true situation with respect 
to facts which might otherwise inure to the benefit of 
appellants. With the actual facts as they exist, \Ve find 
no fault, hut we do feel that such a presentation as is 
done in the final findings of fact included in the record 
on appeal is erroneously prejudicial to the appellants. 
For that reason we wish to review said findings with 
the view of enlightening this court as to what -vve e·ontend 
are the true facts as supported by the record. 
With the first two Findings of :F,act the appellants 
have no objection. Finding of F'act No. :j, which gener-
ally describes the nature of respondents' plant and equip-
Inent, i~ probably oorrect insofar as it goes, but appel-
lants object that it is not cornplc\te and therefore luis-
leading. It should he pointed out that \vhile respondents 
have had a business on the property in question for six-
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10 
teen years, it was not until1951 that it became expanded 
to the extent described in the said finding of fact. (R-145, 
146 and 177 et seq.) 
Finding of Fact No. 4 starts out by stating that 
within a five hundred foot radius of the vVoods Cross 
intersection is one of the most highly industrialized areas 
of the state of Utah. This finding is unwarranted. It 
is true that the record shows that there are certain in-
dustries within a five hundred foot radius of the Woods 
Cross intersection, otherwise known as the intersection 
of Fifth South and Eighth West Streets or Onion Street. 
However, there is nothing in the record which indicates 
the relative industri:alization of this particular section 
of the state as eompared with other industrialized sec-
tions of the state of Utah, and such a finding is not based 
upon any evidence in the record. 
Finding of Fact 4 also finds that the property be-
longing to ap·pell·ants is located within the 500 foot radius 
from the Woods Cross intersection. By application of a 
ruler to defendants' Exhihi t 1, it \Vill be seen that the 
nearest part of the saci.d property is over 575 feet from 
the center of the Woods Cross intersection and appel-
lants' home is over 600 feet therefrom. 
It is uncontested, continuing with the Finding of 
Fact No. 4, that Phillip·s op·erates certain loading racks 
north of appellants' property, though according to re-
spondents' own Exhibit 1, the distance from appellants' 
home is closer to 440 feet than the 350 feet found in said 
finding of fact. 
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It \vas further found in Finding of Fact No. 4, that 
the area in which the appellants live is highly industri-
alized and has been so for the past 16 years. This finding 
of fact was not justified as a glance at defendant's Ex-
hibit 6 and an exarnination of the record will show. In 
defendant's Exhibit 6, the land to the west, to the south 
and to the .east with the exception of the respondents' 
intervening property, is all devoted to residential and 
agricultural uses. It is true that the railroad does run 
in front of appellants' property. 1-f.owever, west of the 
railroad opposite appellants' hon1e and on either side 
of the ra:ilroad running south, the land is devoted ex-
clusively to residential and agricultural uses. While it 
is true that there is some industrialization in the area 
now existing, the record does not sustain the statement 
that the present industrialization has existed for the 
last 16 years. Any intimations contained in the record 
regarding this indicate that the present industr~ialization 
is a fairly recent development with tlu~ exception of the 
Phillips plant. 
The testimony and exhibits also shovv that the pre-
sent industrialization is generously interlaced \\Tith agri-
cultural and residential areas. ( -Defendants' Exhihit 6) 
Finding of ~-,'act No. 5 states that the noises that 
are eaused by the respondents in the pursuit ·of busine~s 
are not unreasonable in view of the area in vvhich they 
are located and are necessary to the conduct of husiness, 
and that the respondents have acted carefully and with 
due regard for the appell~ants and others. F'ul'ther it \vns 
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found that the lights, both headlights and fixed lights, 
do not interfere unreasonably with the health, comfort 
and enjoyment of the appellants. It was further found 
that there are no floodlights at the west of the garage. 
It is contended that the findings of the court are not 
founded in justice nor based upon the testimony presented 
in the trial. The noises that are caused are unreasonable 
in terms of the suffering of appellants as hereinafter 
set forth, and the fact that they are necessary to the 
conduct of the business is not a defense if, to use the 
language of this court, the eonduct is "unlawful, un-
warranted or unreasonable." This is the standard re-
cently en1phasized ill the case of Can'non v. Neuburger, 
( 1954) ____________ Utah ____________ 268 P. 2nd. 425. 
Finding of Fact No. 5 further finds th·at 
"At all times [the defendents] have had due 
regard for the peace, quiet, and rest of the plain-
tiffs; that the plaintiffs are supersensitive to the 
defendants' activities and that this supersensi-
tiveness is oceasioned by the animosity between 
the plaintiffs and the defendant, W. S. Hatch." 
This finding of fact is wholly unfounded upon the 
record. The plaintiff, Glen Hatch, denied that he felt 
any enm'ity toward his brother and denied that he was 
supersensitive to the noise made by his brother's opera-
tion. (R-40) Looking at the record, the trial court .could 
not have made the fin,ding on anim·osity that it did \Yith-
out outside information which was not app:arent in the 
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record. The r~cord itself negatives any sho\ving of ani-
mosity on the part of the appellants. There 1nay he son1e 
suggestion to the effeet that the partition suit brought 
by appellant Glen Hatch against his brother (R-39, 1 8:2) 
is indicative of eerta.in anin1osity. This can hardly be 
sustained and is not a proper inference from such fact. 
Many brothers and sisters are involved in partition 
suits when it is impossible for thelll to reach an agree-
ment as to the use of land or ho\\" to divide land, and 
the fact that such a suit is brought does not necessarily 
entail animosity on the part of the rne1nhers of the farnily. 
'ro presun1e that because the appellants are disturbed 
by the noises create'd by respondents they are super-
sensitive is begging the question. It has been shown that 
the appellants in this case have been subjected to rnuch 
harassrnent and constant annoyance vvhich \vould cause 
any reasonable person to react as they have reacted. 
The testirnony by the appellants and }lrs. ~1oss clearly 
show that they are not supersensitive vvhen they conl-
plain of these things. (See surnmary on p'ages 16 through 
22, infra of this brief) On the contrary, it is highly prob-
able that the complaint of these matters \\Ta~ held off for 
a longer period of time than it 'otherwise rnight have been 
were it not for the fact that two of the opposing partie~s in 
this action are brothers. If there is any ani1nosi ty and 
hard feeling, it appears to originate with the respondent 
vV. S. }latch \vho adrnitted that he had 1uade certain 
irnplied threats when appellants co1nplained to hi111 re-
garding the noise. (R.-192, 193) It is therefol'e ·contended 
that th(~ finding h;r the trial rourt to the t}ff0et ''that the 
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plaintiffs are supersensitive to the defendants' activities 
and that this supersensitiveness is occasioned by the 
animosity between the plaintiffs and the defendant \V. 
S·. Hatch" is comp~letely without foundation and is based, 
so far as can be gathered by appellants, upon information 
obtained wholly ap·art from the record, which infor1nation 
is comp~letely erroneous. 
The finding that the respondents have at all times 
had due regard for the peace, quiet, and rest of ap·pellants 
is not true unless they have done everything in their 
power to reduce, with all reasonably available facilities 
at their command, the noise and annoyances to the barest 
n1inimur.a. This they have not done. It is not enough 
.that they reduce them to the extent that it is convenient 
for the respondents; they must reduce the noises to the 
very minimum which can be procured, even if it is neces-
sary to spend more money in doing so than the appellants' 
prop·erty is worth. In this connection we cite the case 
of Quiwn vs. The American Spiral Spring wnd Manu-
facturing Co., 1928, 293 Pa. 152, 141 A. 855. 61 A.L.R. 
918. 
In that case the plaintiff bought a hon1e in an in-
dustrial area. There was a vacant lot adjacent thereto. 
The defendant bought the vacant lot and built thereon a 
manufacturing pl:ant, locating eertain heayy n1achinery 
close to the plaintiff's property. The operation of the 
machinery caused dan1age to the plaintiff's hon1e and to 
the liveability of the home. The trial court refused to 
grant injunctive relief. The appellate court said, in re-
versing the trial court ; 
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"Defendants, however, g·ave no heed to plain-
tiff's rights. When they purchased the rear lot, 
they were bound to know that while they could 
construct their proposed plant at that place, and 
could operate with the kind of 1na.chinery usual 
in the business, they were nevertheless required 
under the applicable legal principle above stated 
to so locate and install that which they intended 
to use as to do as little injury to the plaintiff 
and his dwelling as was reasonably possible, con-
sideTing the use to which the machinery \Vas to he 
put, and the needs of the business. That is \vhere 
they failed in their legal duty. Apparently they 
thought that as their busin.ess u·a.s a lawful one, 
w·hich they were entitled to carry on at tha.t place, 
no just compla.int could be made if, also, they were 
careful in conducting thei.r opera,tions. Such is 
not the law. [Ernphasis added.] 
"As a:lready stated they \vere still in duty 
bound to so locate and install the heavy 1narhinery 
as not to deprive plaintiff, \Vhen it was properly 
operated, of the degree of quiet he had a right to 
enjoy. Collirns vs. Wa.yne Iron Works, 227 Pa. 
326, 76 Atl. 24, 19 Ann. Cas. 991. This they did not 
do, though they kne-vv, a~s everyonP PlHP does, 
that the noise and vibration ·eould have been 
greatly minimized by plaeing the heavy lnaehin-
ery :at the other side of their lot and that 
this could have been done \Vi thout injury to any 
one. It can still be ren1oved there \vith great 
henefit to plaintiff, at a eost to the defendant of 
son1e twelve thousand dollars and a ceasing of 
operations for a few months while the· work is 
being done. Defendants contend that the machin-
ery was placed in its present position because it 
was e:·: pected to result in a rnore rronornica1 use 
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of the plant, due to the fact that it is easier there 
to load and unload long heavy bars of steel and 
iron, than would result if no -change wa:s made; 
but this is no excuse for injury to the plaintiff. 
(Citing cases.) 
"As defendants are only required to rear-
range the heavy machinery, it is a matter of no 
moment, though evidently the court below thought 
otherwise, that they wi'lllose more money in right-
ing the wrong done than the plaintiff's property 
is worth. This they should have consi'dered before 
they did the :injury; the improper location o[ the 
machinery was their own 'act, uninfluenced by the 
plaintiff, and they have no right to put upon him 
any loss by reason thereof. 14 R,.C.L. 359, 360. 
Besides, 'where justice is properly administered, 
rights are never measured by their mere money 
value, neither are wrongs tolerated because it 
may be to the advantage of the powerful to im-
pose upon the "reak .... The rule is [always] the 
same: "So use your own so as not to injure an-
other." ' " 
We contend that the trial court did not use this standard 
when he made Finding of Fact No. 5 and therefore 
erred in said Finding of Fact. Let us look at what exists 
in the way of annoying activities. 
The testimony shows the follow:ing: 
Mr. Glen A. Hatch testified that the grease guns 
1nake a noise like a series of firing guns, series of loud 
noises and that \Vhen the gun is disconnected froin the 
trucks it usually gives a loud squeal or noise that you 
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can hear all over the country, and the greasing goes on 
pratically every night and every day, and that the re-
spondents do this greasing whenever it pleases them. 
(R-19) That they do their steam cleaning of trucks on 
the outside of the shop building where there isn't any 
cover, just south of the garage, causing a loud hissing of 
steam constantly for hours at a time, so1netin1es during 
the night time. (R-19, 20) That the defendants in the 
changing of tires do a lot of pounding that goes on for 
various lenghts of time-sometiines an hour, and that 
they tune the diesel motors and let then1 run for long 
periods of time causing a constant throb and vibration 
that fills appellants' hon1e with noises and the odors of 
the exhaust. The motors of the trucks run from an hour 
or two to a few minutes and the motors are speeded up 
and shut off and speeded up and shut off and this occurs 
at all hours of the day and night. (R-20, 21) 
That the operation prior to the acquisition of the 
Phillips property wasn't bothersome but has been· since 
said acquisition because of the increase in the ntm1ber of 
units ·and business and the increased use of the garage 
in night work; that the respondents use the shop for 
night work every night in the vveek during the sunnnPr 
season and fall, generally all night during the busy 
season. ( P"21) 
That the iten1s of equip1nent operated by respondent 
are 25 or 30 feet long, some being s1naller, and have 
C'apaci ties anywhere fron1 1500 to 3000 gallons, and 
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some of the larger ones carry a load of 4500 gallons. 
(R-22) 
That ap·pellants cannot sit on their patio in peace 
and quiet without hearing . the motors or pounding of 
tires, even hearing them in their home when the doors are 
closed and :also being able to hear racing motors and 
pounding. That if you sit~down and listen to a diesel motor 
throb for an hour it will certainly disturb you and m·ake 
you very nervous; it disturbs your sleep and rest and 
causes you to become nervous and worry when and how 
long it is going to keep up·, when it is going to start and 
when it is going to stop. It is on your mind constantly 
"\vhen you are inside the house or out and yoru know any 
minute one of the big motors will start up and buzz 
around the yard. (R-22, 23) That the lights are on 
inside the shop· building all night and shine directly into 
appellants home through the window; that they are very 
disturbing, making the home interior light up, and as 
the light shines through the moving trees it causes a 
moving shadow on the walls of the home; that the lights 
appear ·as spotlights. (R-24) 
That the trucks are turned around at a rapid speed, 
faster than necessary, and with no regard to the noise 
made; that they seem to start earlier in the morning on 
·Sunday than other days and work all day greasing trucks, 
changing tires and tuning motors, as 'Yell as on Sunday 
nights. (R- 25, 26) At times they have the motors of 
three or four trucks running at the same tin1e from an 
hour to two hours both day and night, dist.urbjng the 
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appellants even with the doors and windows of their 
home closed. ( R.-28, 29) 
That the respondents stacked everything they could 
gather up it seemed like - junk of every 1nanner and 
description which spilled over on to the appellants' prop-
erty and was placed along the fence line between the ap-
pellants' and respondents' property; that this was cleaned 
up within just a few days prior to the trial of the ease. 
(R-27, 28) 
The plaintiff Edith B. Hatch testified that the de-
fendants started vvith a small business which appellants 
did not expect \vould grow into what it is novv; that 
they did not object because there wasn't interference with 
their living then but as it grew on vvhich it had done the 
past two years, that was when the noise and the trouble 
started; it has doubled or rnore in the last tvvo ye·ars, 
the increase being both night and day, and started \vith 
the acquisition of the Phillips property. (R-74, 75, 76) 
That prior to the last two years they operated th~ 
garage very little during the night time-not enough to 
interfere with appell'ants; that the husiness is no\\' practi-
cally a 24-hour business night and day; that the noise 
of the trucks, the hammering, stea1ning and cleaning of 
the trucks 'and other noises 'disturb her~ that the noises 
can be heard in any part of their honlP \vhether it is 
closed or open, summer or winter; that 'vhen they are 
busier the noise and disturbance is more; it is more in 
' the surn1ner than winter. (R-76) That the doors to the 
\Vork shop are open during the war1n \Vrathor~ rlosrcl jn 
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the cold, hut you C'an still hear the noises with the doors 
closed; that the noises that emit from the operation are 
clearly audible in her bedroom, very much so, so 1nuch so 
that she can't sleep at night; that there is the running of 
the motors continuously and the hammering ·at night 
time, it being exactly the same as in the day time, there 
being no regard to night or day time. (R-77) That they 
operate on Sundays from six o'clock in the morning and 
all evening, there being continuous noise causing nothing 
but eonfusion with noi'se, such continuous noise being 
very wearing- "it hurts." (R-77) 
There are fumes all the tin1e and the lights from the 
shop keep her bedroom bright at night, bright enough so 
that she can look over to her clock across the .room and 
read exactly the time of day; that the lights reflect on the 
mirror on the wall, causing two walls to light up bright. 
It usually bothers her sleep, hut outside the home the 
whole yard is lit up at night; that the noise causes her to 
get up and 'valk around-to go back to bed-try to get 
some rest-get up again and wonder how long the noise 
is going to last. "You don't know - you hope it isn't 
but it goes on." (R-78) 
That they do not have any intention of selling 
their home; that it was built for them to live in and they 
expect to live there and that is what they want; that it had 
been home to ap.pellants, that they had raised their fa1nily 
there, that she had worked for 36 years for her home and 
did not wish to give it up·, and that it would be impossible 
to continue living there as a home under the present con-
ditions; that you can't have your rest disturbed all the 
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time-you can't take it; it breaks your health; you have 
got to have your rest whether it is me or anyone else. 
(R-80) That the constant noise and sound and fumes 
and light coming fro1n the respondents' operation cause 
her to become nervous and upset. (R-82) 
Mrs. Ezra Moss testified that she visited the Glen 
A. Hatch home quite frequently and that she was la.st in 
their home about two weeks prior to the trial, arriving 
about eight o'clock in the evening. That as soon as you 
drive up the lane the lights are always on in some garage 
and you can see very plainly the garage and that there is 
work going on in it; that you would describe the lights 
as flood lights it was so bright; that it appears that the 
lights are on the outside the way they reflect the light to 
you but that she had not been close to the building and 
did not know whether they were inside or outside the 
building. (R-90, 91) That she could hear the noise fro1n 
the operation before coming into the living roon1 of the 
~appellants' home, the noise she notices being a continual 
pound, pound, pound, but she did not kno\v what was 
being pounded and that even in the living roorn \vith the 
windovvs closed, you still noticed the '"pound, pound, 
pound, until you finally say, what in the world is the 
pounding, that is the sensation you have." (R-91, 92) 
~rhat she. stayed until after midnight, about 12 :30, and 
the situation was practically the same vvhen she left-
they were still working, the lights \Vere still on. ~rhat the 
living room is in the west portion of the horne; that on 
other occasions when she visited the home the condition 
has been si1nilar; that she has heard the noise of rna-
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chinery and vibration and the noise of the machinery 
that is going on "back there." That if you stay in the 
home long it would annoy you and on a visit was very 
noticeable. (R-9'2) 
Mr. Frank Hughes, a witness for the respondents, 
testified that in the shop. building there are seven lights 
ill the south stall, two big lights and others in the middle 
stall and ·eight lights in the north stall, they being 150 to 
200 watts each. (R.-116, 117) This is a total of nineteen 
lights and would mean a total of 2850 watts if the lights 
were 150 watts each or 3800 watts if 200 watts each, which 
lights are shining upon ap·pellants' home throughout the 
night. 
There is no question that these things cause great 
annoyance. Do they constitute a nuisance~ Yes. The 
resp-ondents can do a great deal to eliminate most of the 
noise in order to alleviate the torment of the appellants 
without permanently closing down the op·eration. It 
may ·cost some money and time, but the ap·p·ellants are en-
titled to the proper enjoyment of their home. We refer 
again to Quimm v. The American Spiral Spring amd Manu-
facturing Co., supra, wherein it was said that defendant 
had the duty to so locate his equipment that it p·rotected 
plaintiff to the maximum that he was entitled to be pro-
tected .. We contend that this is also the law in this juris-
diction. Even assuming that appellants be held to be 
living in the heart of an industrial district, which, in fact, 
've most certainly deny, they are still entitled to a stand-
ard of quiet consistent with the most quiet operation of 
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adjoining activities as is possible. The most quiet opera-
tion possible can be obtained by more than just telling 
the employees of respondents to be quiet while on duty 
at night. At the very least, an order should he issued 
(a) designating -certain areas of restricted operation dur-
ing certain hours, (b) ordering the moving or changing 
of the location of the building or buildings which are 
causing part of the nuisance, (c) imposing certain restric-
tions upon the use of lights and the direction in which 
they may face, and others at the discretion of the court, 
all of "\Vhich would not be inconsistent in the slightest 
'vith the equitable rights of the pa.rties. 
The testimony in the record shows that after this 
suit was instituted but prior to the trial thereof, the re-
spondents removed certain tires and trash 'vhich lined 
the fence between the appellants' and the respondents' 
property. ( R-27). This led the court to make Finding of 
Fact No. 6 to the effect that the tires and trash are re-
moved and that the property in question, that is, the re-
spondents' property, is as sightly as can be expected 
when considering the nature of the respondents' opera-
tion. The permanence of any such neatness, it is con-
tended, should be insured by the issuance of an injunc-
tion including provisions for continuing such neatness, 
inasmuch as it required the initiation of a court action 
to secure even this concession. 
Finding of Fact No. 7 states that the respondents 
do not load oils and acids on their property, to which 
finding we offer no objection. It also finds that the 
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respondents' business compels night operations which are 
conducted as carefully as possible so as not to disturb 
the .ap·peH.ants, and do not create unnecessary noise. 
T·his, we contend, is an unjustified finding of fact, inas-
much as there is no showing that the respondents could 
not conduct their night operations, if such operations are 
ne~cessary, at a further extremity of either their prop-
erty or the property leased fro1n Phillips Petroleum 
Company and further, so Jnove the position and location 
qf their shop· so as to minimize the nuisance to ap·peH.ants. 
The discussion of the Qui~ ca.se, supra, is applicable 
here, as this finding of fact is really a corollary of Find-
ing of Fact No. 5. We, therefore, take exception to Find-
ing of F'act No. 7 for the grounds mentioned in the dis-
cussion of Finding of Fact No. 5 as well as the ones 
Inentioned herein. 
Finding of Fact Number 8 states that appellants 
have watched respondents' business grow and yet have 
taken no steps to impose any kind of legal restraint upon 
said growth and that, further and notwithstanding these 
facts, app,ellan ts extensively ren1ode'led their home in 
1951, kno\ving that they were in an industrial area. Ap-
pellants take exception to this finding of fact for two rea-
sons : ( 1) that the area is no rnore a highly industrialized 
one tlian it is highly agricultural and residential one, 
and ( 2) that the finding of fact is incon1plete in that it 
leaves out certain very pertinent details and leaves an un-
deHirable imp1lication with regard to certain other half-
stated facts. It is true that the respondents' business 
has been a growing one, but the fact is that it had grown 
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as much in the two years preceding the trial of the ease 
as in all the time before that. (R-145, 146 and 190) Prior 
to 1951 it no doubt constituted an annoyance to plain-
tiffs, but no complaint was made, probably because one 
brother will not complain legally of the other unless 
forced to the limit. But increased annoyances to the ap-
pellants fro1n the use of the tremendously increased fa-
cilities and equipments of respondents, plus the round-
the-clock operation, came to constitute a nuisance "\vhich 
appellants could not permit to continue and hence this 
action to enjoin. 
AppeUants wish to call attention to a well established 
principle concerning nuisances, as set forth in 39 Ameri-
can Jurisprudence 4 72, Nuisances, Sec. 197 : 
"As a rule, it is no justification for maintain-
ing a nuisance that the party co1nplaining of it 
came vo~untarily within its reach. Thus, accord-
ing to the weight of authority the fact that a per-
son voluntarily co1nes to a nuisance by moving 
into the sphere of its injurious effect, or by pur-
ehasing adjoining property or erecting a residence 
or building in the vicinity after the nuisance is 
created, does not prevent hin1 fron1 recovering 
damages for injuries sustained therefrom, or de-
prive him of the right to enjoin its maintenance, 
especially where by reason of changes in the struc-
ture or business compla.ined of, the anrnoyance has 
since been increased ... I3ut \vhile priority of 
occupation is not conclusive as to the existence of 
a nuisance it is to be considered with all the evi-
dence and' the inference drawn from all the facts 
' proved, in deterrnining whether the use of the 
property is unreasonable." ( ernphasis added). 
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"But the fact that one purchases a home in a 
manufacturing district with p-roperty adjoining 
that may be improved for manufacturing purposes 
does not prevent his insisting that any such im-
provement shall he made with due regard to his 
rights as a dweller in a manufacturing district." 
The case of Benjamin et al v. Lietz, 1949, 116 Utah 
476, 211 P. 2d 449 supports the general rule stated in 
American Juris prudence, supra, with respect to the effect 
of expansion of business. In this case, it was the in-
creased use of a planing mil'l in a residential section after 
6 :00 at night and a~l day Sunday that caused an injunc-
tion to issue. This resulted from the increased use of 
the business and not the mere use of the business, in 
and of itself lawful, which had been going on for many, 
many years prior to the initiation of the law suit. 
Further it should be recwlled that the ap·pellant Glen 
A. Hatch was born and partly raised in the house he now 
calls his home, the property concerned in this litigation. 
Moreover, he vvas married and 1noved back into said 
home in 1917. (R-2, 3) The refinery now owned by the 
Phillips Petroleu1n Corporation was started by its pre-
decessor, Wasatch Oill Co., in or around 1931 ( W asa.tch 
Oil Co. v. Wade, 1936, 92 Utah 50, 63 P. 2d 1070). _A_t 
the time when appellants moved into their pTesent home, 
the entire area around, with minor exceptions, \Vas de-
voted to farming and agricultural pursuits. (R-3) Since 
the installation of the oi~ refinery and subsequent expan-
sion thereof, there has grown up some trucking industry 
in the area. But if p-riority of oecupation is to. have signi-
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ficance, as respondents contend and the findings of fact 
imply, then the equities should lie with appe'llants. 
If we follow the contentions of the respondents to 
their logica~ conclusion, it may he seen that there is a 
danger of giving industry more power than is granted 
to the sovereign by the Constitution. If industry moves 
into an area and maintains itself quietly for a number 
of years, then, if respondents' contentions are valid, it 
may operate any lawful business therein, without regard 
for the surrounding area. If people have remodeled or 
improved their homes- or property (and where do \Ve 
draw the line at what constitutes remodeling or improv-
ing~) then they would be estopped fro1n complaining at 
any expansion the industry might make, even though ex-
tensive depreciation to their property was involved. The 
sovereign, in taking property by eminent domain, is re-
quired by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the 
Constitution of the United States to pay for the damage 
to the remaining property as well as for the property 
taken. :Such would not be required of private industry, 
should we accep-t respondents's position. 
It is respectfully submitted that this Finding of Fact 
be rewritten to exclude those facts not justified from 
the testimony and to include all the facts pertinent to 
the case and not just those pertinent to respondents' 
theory of the case. 
Finding of Fact number ten finds that respondents 
did not cause or threaten to cause unreasonable noise, 
but did everything possible to minimize the noise. This 
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~as an unwarranted finding from the testimony. We call 
the court's attention again to Quiwn. v. A.mericam Spiral 
Sp,rirng and Manufactu.ring Con~pany, (1928), 293 Pa"" 
152, 141 A. 85·5, 61 ALR 918, wherein much was r~quired 
of. the defendants in order to assure the plaintiff 'Of the 
most peace and quiet which he could expect under the 
circumstanees. In the present case, the extent of the re-
spondents' attem.pts to maintain quiet has been lin1ited 
to or~ering Defendants' empiloyees to keep doors closed 
(R-184) and not operating at night "n1ore than we have 
to" (R-183). There is some suggestion that a certain 
lane was abandoned and more property leased to Inini-
~ize noises, (R-182, et seq.), hut it haQ. been shown 
earlier in the record that this was the result of the expan-
sion of the business and caine before appellants n1ade any 
real complaint to the conduct of the business. (R-17) In 
<?tl~er words, res.pondents have moved their operation 
only "\Vhen it suited the dictates of their business and 
without regard for ap~pellants except as they might bene-
fl.t incidentally. The fact that they did not benefit is 
. . 
shown by the record in this suit. It is respectfullY. sub-
Initted that this finding of fact is not con1plete and is 
misleading and therefore is not sufficient to justify deny-
ing the · issuance of an order to abate that part of the 
resp-ondents' operation which is a nuisance. 
F'inding of Fact Number 11 is objected to on the 
same grounds as Finding of Fact Number 10. No. 11 
finds .that the respondents' operation is lawfully conduct-
ed with due consideration for the ap·pe'llants, and that 
noises,. odors and lights are maintained at a 1ninimun1 
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consistent with the respondents' operation, and further 
that the maintenance and operation of the respondents' 
business is not a nuisance to the plaintiffs nor does it 
interfere with the plaintiffs' enjoyment of their property. 
It is contended that the finding that there is no nuisance 
is a conclusion of law and is improperly found here as a 
finding of fact. It is further contended that, even accept-
ing, arguendo, the contention that respondents conduct 
their business with a minimum of noise under present 
conditions, it does not follow, per se, that there is no 
nuisance. We again refer the court to Quinn v. American 
Spiral and Manufacturing Company, supra, "\vherein it 
was said that just because disturbances are at a n1inimum 
under present conditions was no reason for saying that 
no nuisance existed but that the final test was the mini-
mum disturbance that could be made with the rnost favor-
able conditions, frorn the point of view of the offended 
party, without stopping defendants' operation altogether. 
We also refer to the discussion and cases cited in the 
next succeeding part of this argument. 
Finding of Fact number 12 is to the effect that no 
damages were shown with respect to the property of the 
appellants or to their persons. We respectfully contend 
this to be the result of an error con1mitted by the trial 
court in excluding this evidence. We will discuss this 
n1ore fully in the third part of this argurhent. 
The thirteenth and final finding of fact is to the ef-
fect that the appellants' location in an industrialized 
area has subjected them to noises, odors and lights and 
similar annoyances· from the refinery, rai~Iroads, trnrks 
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and small businesses, other than respondents', in the 
neighborhood. To a certain extent this is true, but it is 
not these other incidental noises that are the subject of 
ap~pellants' complaint. To help justify this finding re-
spondents may point to the testimony of the witness E. 
B. Rawlins to the effect that he has lived in the next house 
south from the home of the appellants and that he has 
heard certain noises from the various activities in the 
neiglrborhood, but that nevertheless he has made no 
complaint thereof. This testimony was. elicited by the 
respondents, no doubt to show that disturbances. other 
than those produced by defendants do exist in the neigh-
borhood. This. a.p·pellants did not deny. App·ellants fur-
ther elaborate to say that if the only disturbances they 
had to contend with were the ones discussed by Mr. 
Rawlins in his testimony, this action wouid never have 
been instituted. Unfortunately, app·ellants must put up 
with much more than Mr. Rawlins and the difference lies 
wholly "\vith the respondents' operation which immedi-
ately adjoins the property of the app-ellants, but is sever-
al hundred feet from the home of Mr. Rawlins, with an 
orchard intervening. Respondents think it strange that 
if appellants complain of the disturbances from respond-
ents' operation they don't complain of the disturbances 
from other businesse~s in the neighborhood. It is not 
strange at all. The other businesses do not create the 
disturbance to appellants any more than they do to 1Ir. 
Rawlins, hut the sa1ne cannot be said of respondents.' 
business as shown by testin1ony elicited by and from ap-
pellants during the trial. 
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It can be seen fro1n the foregoing discussion that 
there are several findings of fact which are not supported 
by the testimony. It is respectfully requested that the 
court re-exan1ine the record in the light of what has been 
said hereinabove to determine whether the findings of 
fact ~should be sustained or overruled and other findings 
substituted therefor. It is a well established rule that 
upo:n an appeal in a case where equitable relief has been 
sought, the appellate court may review not only the appli-
cation of the rules of law, but may '\veigh the evidence 
'\Vi th a view to examining the findings of fact in the lower 
court. We respectfully contend that the substantial 
weight of the evidence is contrary to the findings of the 
trial court, and that an actionable nuisance does obtain in 
this case as shown by the record. 
It is therefore respectfuily submitted that the find-
ings of fact in this particular case should he along the 
lines or substantially like the ones hereafter suggested: 
1. That the plaintiffs are the ovvners and in posses-
sion of the real property, including the in1proven1ents 
thereon, particularly described in plaintiffs' con1plaint ~ 
that said property is located in Woods Cross, Davis 
County, Utah, and adjacent to '\vhat. is con1monly called 
"Onion Street". 
2. rrhat the defendant W. S. IIatch Company is a 
L_:tah corporation engaged in transportation of oils and 
acids by rneans of tank trucks and trailers and has 20 
to 50 ernployees, depending upon the season of the year; 
that the defendant WillardS. Hatch is the President and 
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Manager of W. S. Hatch Company and is the owner of 
the real property adjacent to and immediately north of 
the real property of the p·laintiffs deserrbed in plaintiffs' 
complaint; that the plaintiff, Glen A. Hatch and the de-
fendant Willard S. Hatch are brothers. 
3. That more than 16 years prior to this case, the 
defendant WiUard S. Hatch co1nmenced an oil distri-
bution business which steadily expanded through the en-
suing years until at the p·resent time defen·dants conduct 
a large oil and acid transportation and distribution busi-
ness on the premises of the defendant W. S. Hatch; 
that a garage ·and service building 'is located on the · 
premises of the defendant W. S.- Hatch· at a point approx-
imating 225 feet northeasterly from p·laintiffs' home; 
that said garage and service building is used in the 
maintenance, repairing and servicing and cleaning o:f the 
tank trucks., semi-trailers, trailers and other equipment 
owned and maintained by the defendanst in their trans-
portation and distribution business·; that the defendant 
W. S. Hatch Comp-any at all times since about June, 1950 
has had under lease property belonging to Phillips Pe-
troleum Comp·any and ;located adjacent to and imm·e-diate-
1-y: east of the said garage and real property of the 
defendant W. S. I-Iatch; that since the acquisition of the 
aforementioned Phillips Petroleum property the defend-
ants' op·eration has materially increased, the equipment 
belonging to said defendants having been doubled since 
'that time and substantial imp-rovements having been 
made upon the real property of defendant; that during 
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the busy season of the year defendent's operation con-
tinues unabated for 24 hours a day, and all day Sunday; 
that the said real property including the leased property 
is also used for parking and storing equipment belonging 
to the defe·ndants. 
4. That the area in which plaintiffs live is devoted 
to residential and agricultural, and industrial purposes; 
that the industry which immediately surrounds plaintiffs' 
home consists of a railroad whiCJh runs North and South 
at a distance of 195 feet to the West of 'said house with 
a siding which runs pavallel with said railroad at a dis-
tance of 175 feet to the west of said house and defendants 
business which bounds plaintiffs on the North and East; 
that to the north of the Woods Cross intersection, and 
over 700 feet from Plaintiffs' property, the PhiNips 
Petroleum Company operates and maintains a large bulk 
plant, a refinery and "cat cracker" having a crude oil 
capacity of from 10,000 to 12,000 barrels a day; that 
Phillips Petroleurn 'Company also owns, operates and 
maintains two racks for loading tank trucks vvith road 
oil, diesel fuel and light fuel oils and that said facilities 
(except for an intervening lot approxiina.ting 50 feet in 
width) are adjacent to defendants' place of business and 
immediately North thereof; that from the plaintiffs' horne 
to the said loading racks is approxirnately 440 feet and 
that from 47 to 100 tank trucks a day are loaded at such 
racks; that some trucks from this loading platform travel 
along Onion Street but not enough to be a reat annoy-
ance; that during a 24 hour period, normally about 42 
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trains travel .North or South past plaintiff's home; that 
each of said trains whistles for the Woods Cross cross-
ing; that at the point where Onion Street intersects the 
rfl.ilroad tracks said tracks are equipped with bells and 
flashing lights for warning traffic; that the total elapsed 
time t~at trains are in a position to bother residents in 
the. area does not exceed two hours, a day, spread out 
over a twenty-four hour period; that there are other gar-
ages besides respon-dents in the areta but that they oper-
ate -off Fifth South Street rather than Eighth West 
Street, the nearest one being 49·5 feet from plaintiffs' 
home; that the portio~ of Onion Street adjacent to and 
immediately in front of plaintiffs' home is traveled both 
day and night by an average of only 5 plus trucks per 
h-our; that the area across from the railroad tracks to 
the W es,t and on either side of said tracks to the ·south 
from plaintiffs' property and to the South of Plaintiffs' 
property and to the East of plaintiffs' prop-erty, exclud-
ing that prop·erty owned or leased by defendants, and the 
property interlacing the industrial plants within a 500 
foot radius of the Woods Cross intersection is devoted to 
agricultural uses; that all of these many activities 
characterize the ar_ea in which the prop~erty of the plain-
tiffs i'S 1oc~ted as residential, agricultural and industrial, 
and that this characteriz~tion has been relatively recent, 
the area formerly being p.rimarily agricultural and resi-
dential. 
5. T 1hat the tires, tubes, old lumber, batte.ries, etc., 
of which plaintiffs complain were removed from the 
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property of said defendant8 only after this suit was in-
stituted, and that defendants have given plaintiffs no 
cause to complain in this regard from that time up to the 
time of the trial; that it required the institution of a la;w 
suit to secure removal of said trash. 
6. That the- nature of the defendants' business. is 
such that during the busy season \Vhich extends from 
April until November, it is operated for 24 hours a day 
during which ti1ne the servicing and repairing of motor 
ve-hicles and other routine- items are carried on regardless 
of the tin1e of day or night. 
7. That the plaintiffs have observed the carrying 
on of defendants' business on a relatively small scale for 
a number of years without legal complaint because said 
conduct did not hamper plaintiffs' enjoyment of their 
home and property; ~hat the increased use of defendants' 
property has caused 1nuch discomfort to plaintiffs; that 
plaintiffs extensively remodeled their home in 1951 with 
the view of ·making it more liveable; that defendants' 
operations have doubled since that time. 
8. That the operation and maintenance of the busi-
ness of the: defendants referred to in plaintiffs' con1plaint 
is performed in a lawful, but otherwise annoying man-
ner; that said annoyances could he reduced and in many 
cases eliminated by defendants moving their shop posi-
tion and restricting the use of the equipment to the area 
furthest away from plaintiffs' home; that as th'e property 
stands and is being used, it constitutes an unreasonable 
and un\varranted use of the property with respect to 
plaintiffs' rights as landowners. 
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9. That the home of plaintiffs in its pre'Sent location 
h·as been subjected to noises, odors and lights originating 
from some of the industries in the area, but these minor 
annoyances have not been of the proximity, severity or 
continuous nature that those: originating with defendants 
have been. 
10. ·That s1nce 1951 defendants' increased use of 
the property adjoining plaintiffs has doubled, causing 
plaintiff much annoyance~ mental anguish, discomfiture 
and a lessening of enjoyment by piaintiffs of their home; 
that said annoyances consist of high power lights in al-
most constant use which glare upon plaintiffs' home, of 
hammering and pounding and squealing and hissing 
which creates loud and unusual noises, of running of mo-
tors and engines at all hours, causing noise, vibration and 
dbnoxious fumes to enter piaintiffs' prop·erty; that such 
use by defendants of their prop·erty is unrea'sonable:·and 
unwarranted under -all the circumstances. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT NO 
NUISANCE EXIS'TS OR EXISTED, WHICH ERROR WAS 
BASED UPON A MISCONCEPTION OF THE LAW AND A 
MISINTERPRETA·TION O·F THE FACTS AS BROUGHT OUT 
BY THE EVIDENCE; AND THEREFO·RE THE TRIAL 
COURT FURTHER ERRED IN FAILING TO GRANT 
APPELLANTS INJUNCTIVE RELIEF. 
The law of nuisance is one largely of balancing the 
equities and degrees of annoyance in favor of both 
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parties. There are t"\vo types of nuisances ; nuisances per 
se and nuisances per accidens. Nuisances per se are those 
nuis.ances or activities which, regardless of location or 
care of operation, are always the subject of injunctive 
relief; and to plead and prove that such an activity 
exists is .sufficient in and of itself to entitle the pleader 
to relief. It is not contende~d that the nuisance complained 
of herein falls into this category. 
Nuisances per accidens are those nuisances which 
occur not because the activity claimed to be a nuisance 
is unlaw'ful, but because the ·manner in wh~ch it is con-
ducted or the location wherein it is conducted or some 
other factor which may or may not be inherent therein 
is sufficient to make the activity a nuisance to the plead-
er. This is the type of nuisance that is complained of 
here. 
The word "nuisance" as used in cases, legal texts 
and encyclopedias is often a misused term. Sometimes 
it is meant as a mere annoyance and the term then is 
divided into two groups which are said to he "actionable 
nuisances'' or ''non-actionable nuisances''. At other 
times , the word ''nuisance'' as used in a legal sense 
rneans that annoyance or interference for 'vhich there is 
some legal or equitable remedy. As used hereinafter, 
the latter use of the word shall be ·mainta~ned. It should 
be borne in mind, ho"\vever, that son1e of the citations 
will not observe the same niceties of expression. 
In Utah the courts have evolved some modification 
' 
of the doctrine, so "\vell known at Common Law, that 
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one _should "so use his own so as not to injure another." 
Any modification that has occurred, howeveT, has been 
limited· to the balance of the equities. What constitutes 
balancing the equities~ This court, as late as the case of 
Cannon v. Neuberger, 1954, 268 P. 2d 425, has maintained 
a standard that no person may have an injunction for the 
abatement of a nuisance, unless the use of the land or 
activity to be enjoined is "ttnlawful, unreasonable. or 
unwarranted.'' 
·But vvhat constitutes such unlawful, unreasonable 
or. unwarrante-d activity~ Is it sufficient to say that if 
the activity is lawful and conducted in accordance with 
good .. busriness operating procedure there can be no 
nuisance~ We respectfully contend that such is not the 
case.· We wish to call attention to the. discussion of this 
and a related problem in 61 ALR 924 at 932. The annota~ · 
tion discusses the various views regarding the compara-
tiy~. injury doctrine and quotes from the case of Brede 
v. Minnesota Cru~she~d Ston-e Co., (1919), 143 Minn. 324 
173- NW 805, 6 ALR 1092 as follows : 
''If the injury complained of is caused by the 
operation of a lawful business, carried on in a 
~district given over to kindred classes of business, 
and the injury is only ~such as naturally flo,-;·s 
from the operation of the business of that charac-
ter, an injunction will not be granted if it vvould 
· entail a serious injury to the -defendant or to the 
public as compared to the injury complained of 
by the plaintiff. This is comm'Only referred to as 
the 'eompar,ative injury doctrine'. The cas~~~ 
in which this doctrine has been given effect are 
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collected in the note to Bristol v. Palmer, 31 LR.A. 
(N.S.) 881-893 and in 20 R. C. L. 480. Other 
authorities adopt the ancient doctrine that the 
rights of habitation are superior to the rights of 
trade, and, whenever they .conflict, the rights of 
trade must yield to the primary or natural right. 
They hold that, if a lawful business is ·conducted 
in such a 1nanner as to offend or interfere materi-
ally with ordinary physical comfort, measured 
not by the standards of delicate sensibilities and 
fastidious habits, but by the standards of ordinary 
people, a permanent injunction should be granted. 
The cases so holding are also collected in the note 
to Bristol v. Palmer, 31 LRA (NS) 888, and it is 
said that this doctrine is supported by the greater 
weight of authority. We are of the opinion that 
the latter is a better doctrine, and ·that ordinarily 
it should be applied in determining whether an 
injunction should he granted or denied in eases 
such as this. ' ' 
In America;n Smelting and Refining Co. v. Godfrey, 
1907, CCA. 8th Cir.) 158 F. 225, certain farmers located 
close to the refining plants of the defendants sued to 
enjoin the operation of the smelters and refining plants 
on the ground that their operation was doing very serious 
dan1age to a widespread agricultural area in the Salt 
Lake valley. This claim of damage was largely substan-
tiated but the defendant claimed th3Jt their industry was 
an important and significant one in the state of Utah, 
that tl1Py hi red a number of people and contributed sub-
stantially to the economy of the state. They contended 
that to enjoin them \Vould cause much more harm to 1the 
public than failure to enjoin \\ronld cause to the plaintiffs. 
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The court did not agree with this contention, but said 
further: 
"However that may be, we do not think the 
fact that an actual injury resulting from the vio-
lation of a right is small, and the interest to be 
affected by an injunction is large, should weigh 
against the interp,osition of preventative power 
in equity, when it is clear that on one hand a right 
is violate~d an~d on the other a wrong committed.'' 
An injunction was issued in this case which made 
provision for certain remedies to be introduced into the 
operation of Defendan~ts' plants. 
A later case evidently reflects another attempt to 
enjoin the same industry. Anderson v. American Smelt-
ing and Refining Co., 1919, D.C. Utah, 265 F. 928. This 
case involved a question of fact as to whether the defen-
dant smelters issued so much sulphur dioxide into the 
atmosphere that it was harmful to the crops. The court 
diS'cusses this fact at great length and points out the 
scientific developments in the industry \Yhich have di-
minished such emissions sin·ce the Godfrey case, supra, 
was handed down. Judge Tillman D. Johnson, then 
District Judge, came to the conclusion that, \Yhile he did 
not want to completely enjoin the operation of the defen-
dant smelters, he felt that more could he done to cut down 
on the ·emission of harmful gases. Judge Johnson re-
quired defendants to explore the possibility of reducing 
further the sulfurous emissions and shoul~d they fail to do 
so he said he \Yould enjoin the entire operation. 
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This .attitude on the part of the courts has continued 
down to the present day and manifests itself again in the 
case of Shaw v. Salt Lake County, 1950, Utah, 224 P. 2d 
1037. In that ca:se the county operated a gravel pit and 
rock crusher adjacent to the premises of plantiffs. Upon 
suit to enjoin the operation of the gravel pit, it \Vas con-
tended that the public good outweighed private rights in 
this caBe. This court, finding that the gravel pit would 
be just as effective if located else\vhere, affirmed the 
trial court's ruling that the County move to a new loca~ 
tion, saying that public good did not outweigh private 
rights in such a cas·e. 
These cases show that to protect a right that has 
been invaded, courts will go to great lengths even vvhen 
the right protected is of a lesser pecuniary value than the 
right enjoined. 
Appellants have shovvn what the facts are surround-
ing this particular case and have shoV\rn the standards 
which the ·Courts use in determining "Whether a given acti-
vity is a nuisance and wha~t can be done to minimize a 
nuisance. There can be no doubt but what the activities 
of the respondents constitute a grave annoyance to 1he 
appellants, and this the respondents only incidentally 
try to deny. Ra~ther than deny the existence of the factors 
which, singly and collectively, make up the nuisanee, they 
rely upon certain defenses or justifications as follows: 
(a) Respondents' business is conducted in a lavvful, 
modern and efficient manner; 
(b) The noises caused by respondents are nec-
es~~arily inc-ident to the operation of their business~ 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
42 
(c) Th·e business is conducted in an in~dustrial area, 
and appellants' home is in the same area; and 
(~d) The appellants were aware of respondents' 
business as early as 1937, and yet, notwithstanding that 
fact and the fact that there are other businesses and in-
dustries in the area, they extensively remodeled their 
house in 1951. 
Taking these defenses one by one, we ·can start with 
the defense that because respondents conduct their busi-
ness in a lawful, modern and efficient mann·er, they can 
cause these annoyances to appellants with impunity. 
The case of Benjamin -et al v. Lietz, ( 1949) 116 Uta'h 
476, 211 P. 2d 449 is ;a good answer to this contention. 
~ In that case, this court affirmed the lower court's 
granting of an injunction, enjoining the operation of a 
planing mill business during certain hours on week days 
and all day on Sllnday. The defen·dent owned and oper-
ated a planing mill at 2032 South lOth East Street in 
Salt Lake City. The planing mill had existed since ap-
proximately 1900. Prior to 1944 or 1945, the planing mill 
was enclosed in a fram·e building, but in 1944 or 1945, the 
·defendant erected a cinder block building some 30 feet 
wide by 60 feet long, immediately to the rear of the frame 
building and adjoining it. In 1947 the defendant con-
s(tructed a concrete apron extending along the s·outh and 
west si,des of the building, and placed th·ereon certain 
equipment and machinery used in connection 'vith the 
planing mill. Enclosed within the new ·building was some 
of the machinery theretofore used in th.e frame building, 
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some ~machinery \vhich replaced machinery from the old 
frame building, and some new machinery not designed 
as replacernent for existing m~aehinery but rather as 
additional machinery. The potential horsepower of mach-
ineTy inst,alled prior to 1943 was 125, and the present 
potential at the time of trial was 149¥2. The expansion 
of the mill began in 1943 when the defendant re·ceived 
certain government contracts for boxes during the war. 
Plaintiffs were residents near the planing mill, some 
of whom were property ovvners, and others not. They 
complained of increased activity in and around the plan-
ing mill of recent years, commencing vvith 1943, both 
during daylight hours and extending into the night, and 
all day Sundays, which interferred \vith ~their property 
enjoyment, rest and peace of mind. 
The Court held that prior to 1943, the defendant had 
not made ~a practice of operating after 6:00 o'clock P.M., 
and when he did -operate after that hour that it was only 
done in a manner that did not diS'turb nearby residents. 
The situation \vas similar all day on Sundays. The 
Court further found that after 1943 the operation of the 
planing mill during ihe evening and night hours and on 
Sundays resulted in loud and unusual noises at hours 
\Vhen the mill had not theretofore been used; that these 
noises were of sufficient intensity to make normal conver-
sa·tions difficult for plaintiffs in their homes and inter-
ferred with sleep and caused plaintiffs considerable dis-
comfort. 
This court approved the lower Court's findings upon 
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the evidence, and in answer to the defendant's conten-
tion that the plaintiffs failed to state a cause of action 
in their complaint, stated at page 479: 
"Appellant takes the position that the plain-
tiffs failed to state a·cause of action in their com-
plaint. This contention is without merit. The 
eomplaint in substance follows the complaint test-
ed in Thompson v. Anderson, 107 Utah 331, 153 
P. 2d 665, which was held to be sufficient in that 
case. That appellant's business was a 'lawful busi-
ness' in no way affects this holding, since a law-
ful b,usiness may be operated so as to constitute 
a nuisance. Thompson v . ..._t\.nderson, supra; and 
Brough v. Ute Stampede Ass'n., 105 Utah 446, 
142 p. 2d 670." 
The case of Thompson v~ Anderson, 1944, 107 Utah 
331, 153 P. 2d 665, referred to in the B enja.min case, 
supra, also sup~ports the rule that lawfulness of operation 
is not a defense. In that case the defendant-appellant 
con1plained that their demurrer to the complaint should 
not h·ave been overruled because, to use this court's sum-
mariza ti'On of the eon ten tion and its answer thereto, 
(page 334) 
"there is no complaint that defendant',s business 
is not a lawful business, and that the sounds which 
annoy the plaintiffs are not unusual and not the 
ordinary sounds emanating from such a business 
as defendant is conducting. But even sounds nor-
.mally inherent in the nature of a business 1nay 
under some circumstances constitute a nuisance. 
In Brough v. Ute Stampede Ass'n., 105 Utah 446, 
142 P. 2d 670 at 674, it was not alleged or shown 
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that the noises of which complaint was made vvere 
any but the usual noises attendant upon a carnival. 
The projected business was lawful had in fact 
been speeially licensed by the city e~uncil in past 
years, and yet we affirn1ed the judgment enjoin-
ing the holding of the carnival in front of the 
plaintiff's property." 
In this same vein, we wish to cite 39 Am. Jur. 323, 
"Nuisances", Para. 43: 
"A business which is la-\vful in itself may be-
come a nuisance, either because of the locality in 
which it is carried on or because it is conducted 
. . In an Improper manner. 
"The owner of property has a right to conduct 
thereon any lawful busines~s not per se a nuisance, 
as long as the business is so conducted that it will 
not unreasonably inconvenience a neighbor in the 
reasonable enjoy1nent of his property. But every 
business, however lawful, must be conducted with 
due regard to the rights of others, and no one 
has a right to erect and maintain a nuisance to the 
injury of his neighbor even in the pursuit of a 
lawful trade, or to conduct a business on his own 
land in such a way as 'vill be injurious or offensive 
to those residing in the vicinity or those traveling 
on an adjoining high,vay. 
"A trade or business la,vful in itself becomes 
a nuisance when from the situation, its inherent 
qualities or the manner in which it is conducted, 
it causes a material injury to the property of an-
other, interferes 'vith his con1fort and enjoyment, 
injures the health of those living in the vicinity, 
or interferes with their ordinary physical com-
fort, measured by the habits and feelings of ordi-
nary people. It is not necessary that life or health 
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be endangered; it is sufficient if the business pro-
duces that which is offensive to the senses, and 
which renders the enjoyment of life and property 
uncomfortable. The mere fact, however, that a 
business is objectionable to others, or that proper-
ty in the immediate neighborhood may be ad-
versely affected by it, is not sufficient ground for 
an injunction. All persons hav-e t'he right to irnsist 
that a business in any degree offensive or darn-
gerous to them shall be carried on with such im-
proved mewns arnd .appliances as e:xperi.ence and 
science may suggest or supp.Zy, arnd with such 
reasonable care as m.ay preveVfl).t unJYt.ece.ssary in-
convenience to them. By such care and improved 
methods and appliances, many occupations that 
formerly were regarded as nuisances beeause of 
their-annoyance to the senses may now be carried 
on in even populous neighborhoods without of-· 
fense to anyone. However, proof of negligence is 
not essential in cases of this kind; and a person 
carrying on a business 1nay be liable for n1aintain-
ing a nuisance although he uses the most approved 
methods and appliances in conducting it, and 
although the annoyances complained of are ordi-
nary incidents of such a business when properly 
conducted.'' (Emphasis 'added.) 
And in 39 Am. Ju.r. 327, Par. 45, it is said: 
"The law takes care that lawful and useful 
business shall not be put a stop to on account of 
every trifling or imaginary annoyance, such as 
may offend the taste or disturb the nerves of a 
fastidious or over-refined person. But, on the 
other hand, it does not allow anyone, whatever 
his circumstances or conditions may be, to be 
driven fron1 hjs home, or to be compelled to live 
in it in positive discomfort, although caused by 
lawful and useful business ·carried on his vieinity." 
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And Page 341, Par. 58: 
"As in other cases, the fact that a business 
causing the nuisance is carried on in a careful and 
prudent manner, and that nothing is done by those 
managing it that is not a reasonable and neces-
sary incident of it, does not constitute a defense." 
It may be seen from these excerpts and citations that 
the defense of performance in a lawful, mode·rn and effi-
cient manner is not a valid one if other conditions which 
cause annoyance .exist. 
Coming to the second defense, that the noises caused 
by the respondents are necessarily incident to the opera-
tion of their business, it may be seen that much that was 
said with respect to the other defense will also be applic-
able here. Especially is this true of Thompson v. And:er-
son, supra, where it was said that "even sounds normally 
inherent in the nature of a business may under some cir-
cumstances constitute a nuisance," citing Brough v. Ute 
Stampede Ass'n., 1943, 105 Utah 446, 142 P. 2d 670. 
In the Brough case the defendant for some years past 
had run, adjacent to plaintiff's proper~ty, a carnival \vhich 
had been specially licensed by the city council. The trial 
court granted an injunction against the operation of the 
carnival, and this court affirmed, in effect saying that the 
fact that a business is lawful and that the noises which 
emanate therefrom are necessarily incident to the busi-
ness and normal therein is of no consequence if there 
indeed is so much annoyance as to constitute a nuisance. 
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To the same effect is the case of Roukovitna v. IslO/YI)d 
Farm Creamery Co., .19·24, 160 ~linn. 335, 200 N.W. 350, 
38 A.L.R. 1502, in which case the plaintiff resided in a 
residential district that abutted on an alley to the rear 
of a business street upon which a creamery was being 
conducted. The creamery .had been established many 
years ~before the plaintiff purchased the p·roperty. Never-
theless, the Court enjoined the loading of milk trucks and 
the operation of an ice crushing machine, unles~s muffled,· 
during the hours ordinarily devoted to sleep. On page 
351 of the Northwest Reporter, Vol. 200, it is said: 
"The contention is also that, since defendant 
is conducting a lawful and useful business no · 
more noisily than is ordinarily incident to its 
proper conduct, and at such period of the night 
as is absolutely necessary in that business, no 
injunction ·should issue, especially since plaintiff 
acquired his building long after defendant 'vas 
established there. The contentions urged are all to 
be considered. It is true that the character of the 
business sought to be interfered with, its exten-
. siveness, its useful!less to the public, the noises, 
odors, and disturbances necessarily attending its 
conduct, the condition and use of the surrounding 
property, the relative hardship as between the 
parties to the litigation, and who was first upon 
the ground, are to be given due weight by the chan-
cellor. But still, where it is found that a nuisance 
within the definition of the cited statute exists 
and.seriously interfered with another's enjoyment 
of life and property, it should be abated~ especial-
ly so where, a.s here, the superior rights of habita-
tion over business or trade rights invoke relief." 
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Thus it can be seen that just because the noises are 
normal to and necessary incidental to the business is no 
excuse for maintaining a nuisance. 
The respondents also claim that because they are lo-
cated in an industrial area it is sufficient justification 
for maintaining a nuisance with respect to the property 
of the appellants. First we should like to point out that 
the record and testimony do not support the contention 
that this is an industrial neighborhood any more than 
it is a residential or argicultural neighborhood. Neither 
type of land use has attained sufficient priority in the 
area to be able to dominate the other. However that may 
be, we contend that the law is such that it is no defense 
to a charge of maintaining a nuisance that there are other 
similar annoyances in the neighborhood or that the area 
is an industrial one. Perhaps the leading Utah case in 
support of this contention is Lu.dZow v. Colorado A.rnimal 
By-Products Co., 1943, 104 Utah 221, 137 P. 2d 347. In 
that case it was contended that the odors emitted from 
defendant's animal by-products plant did not constitute 
a nuisance due to the fact that the plant was located in 
an industrial rather than an agricultural district. The 
defendant in that case pointed out that within a radius 
of several miles from the plant there were in existence, 
or had been in existence, factories and industries which 
rendered the area an industrial rather than an agricul-
tural one, pointing out the existence of ( 1) a sugar fac-
tory; ( 2) a pea vinery; ( 3) two railroads ; ( 4) a flour 
mill; ( 5) an alfalfa feed mill; ( 6) beet storage and load-
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1ng chutes adjoining each railroad; (7) wool loading 
platforms; (8) a local brickyard; ( 9) livestock feeding 
yards; and ( 10) livestock loading pens on both railroads. 
Defendants also claimed that there were other smells 
and odors that were obnoxious in the area, and that the 
smells caused by the defendant's plant were mere inci-
dents of the industrial area. 
However, the court ~aid, at pages 229 and 230: 
"We also must reject the argument that the 
existence of some of the facilities pointed out by 
counsel for defendants, made the region an indus-
trial rather than an agricultural area; although 
in view of what we have said, the fact that a re-
gion actually may be industrial does not justify 
the creation with impunity of odors or stenches 
to an excessive degree which unreasonably annoy 
others in the legitimate use of their properties or 
in their occupations, especially when such condi-
tions depreciate the value of other properties in 
such area. The evidence sho,vs that the sugar fac-
tory; pea vinery, stock-feeding yards and loading 
platforms are essential to the marketing of agri-
cultural products and livestock. The region con-
sists principally of farms on which there are 
homes and other buildings characteristic of rural 
life. In most instances the farmers .and livestock 
raisers reside on their far1ns." 
The court further held that the fact that an industry 
might serve a useful purpose or produce com1nercial 
commodities did not warrant its location at a place which 
1nerely suited the· convenience of the o'vner or operator 
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in utter disregard for the effect it has on the value or 
enjoyment of other properties; and that the fact that 
there might already exist conditions that are obnoxious 
in the area did not -create a license for the establishment 
of other or more offensive conditions. 
On page 230 of the Utah report of the case the court 
states: 
"When an industry is of such a character that 
it produces foul odors, those who are responsible 
for its operation have the duty to place it where. 
it will not result in injury to the property of 
others. The mere fact that there may already ex-
ist in the area a condition which may be obnoxious 
to some persons, does not create a license for es-
tablishment of other more offensive conditions." 
In QU!inm v. The America.n Spiral Spring and Mwnu-
facturing Co., (1928), 293 Pa. 152, 141 A. 855, 61 A.L.R. 
98, the court granted an injunction to prevent a manu-
facturer from continuing his business as it then stood 
without making drastic changes in its construction in 
order to save the plaintiff's home and his enjoyment 
thereof. This was done in spite of the fact that plaintiff 
lived in the heart of an industrial and manufacturing 
area. 
The New Mexico court has fairly recently made a 
statement to the same effect, when it said: 
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"And it is also clear that it is no justification 
for Inaintaining a nuisance tha.t other persons 
maintain similar nuisances or tolerate acts 
amounting to a nuisance in the vicinity. See 39 
An1. J ur., 300, Sec. 18." Barrett v. Lopez, 1953? 
N.M., 262 P. 2d 981. 
r~Phis principle has been set forth in the citation fron1 
39" Arn. Jur.; 323, Nuisances, Sec. 43, supra, and also in 
17 ALR 2d 1280 : 
"Par. 8. EXISTENCE OF SIMILAR CON-
DITION:S IN THE AR.EA. 
"Generally, the creating or maintaining of a· 
nuisance is not justified or excused by the fact 
that other persons maintained similar nuisances 
in the vicinity. Hence, even though the area in 
which the rendering or bone boiling is carried on 
is predominantly industrial, or occupied by other 
establishments of equal objection, it has been held 
that such facts do. not justify the creation of a 
nuisance within the area by sueh animal render-
ing." (citing cases, including Ludlow v.· Colorado 
Animal By-Prodttcts Co.) 
39 Am. Jur., 325, Nuisan·ce's Par. 44: 
"It has been said that in the eye of the law 
no place can be convenient for the carrying on of 
a busines~s which is a nuisance and causes substan-
tial injury to the property of another. But the 
locality and surroundings are to be taken into 
· consideration in determining whether a business 
or an industrY is so conducted as to constitute a 
. . 
nuisance as a matter of fact. 
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39 Am. JUAr. 326: 
"That a neighborhood is devoted to some ex-
tent to industry does not authorize one to conduct 
his business in such a manner as to interfere with 
the right of property owners to the clean comfort 
of their residences. One constructing a manufaC-
turing plant adjoining a home located in a manu-
facturing district must so locate and install that 
which he in tends to use so as to do as little injury 
to the adjoining dwelling and its owner as is rea-
sonably possible, considering the use to which 
his machinery is to be put and the needs of th'e 
business." 
It can be seen from the foregoing citations that the 
fact that a business is conducted in an industrial area 
adjacent to a residence is no excuse for justification for 
causing undue, unreasonable or unwarranted interference 
"\Vith those who are entitled to enjoy the re,sidence as a 
home. 
It is said that the appellants were aware of the re-
spondents' business as early as 1937; and yet, notwith-
standing the fact there are other businesses and indus-
tries in the area, they extensively re1nodeled their hom~ 
in 1951. First of all we wish to emphasize the fact that 
it is not the mere existence of respondents' business 
which constitutes the alleged nuisance; it is the expan-
sion of that business, which is all out of proportion to the 
conduct of the business in 1937 until 1951, that brings 
about this clain1. It is the expansion of the busines~s from 
1951 that has caused the great amount of annoyance and 
discornfort to the plaintiffs. However, we contend that, 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
54. 
even accepting defendants' contention that plaintiffs 
"1noved into the nuisance," this is no defense if, in fact, 
the defendants are conducting a nuisance. 'Ve cite from 
the annotation beginning 167 A.L.R. 1364 concerning 
''coming to a nuisance" as a defense or operation as an 
estoppel. At page 1366 the annotation says: 
''Some courts have expressed the view that 
while priority of occupation is no defense, it is a 
factor which may be considered in determining 
the character of the locality leading to the deter-
Inination of the reasonableness of the defendant's 
use of his property. A number of courts have 
emphasized the fact of tl1e priority of the objec-
tionable condition without specifically deterinin-
ing the singular conclusiveness of this factor as a 
defense; but it is apparent that where it is found 
that a thing, business, or occupation is not a nuis-
ance because, in view of the locality or surround-
ings, it constitutes a reasonable use of the prop-
erty, the question of whether the complainant 
came to the nuisance, or the nuisance came to the 
-complainant is of no importance. 
II. \TIEvV THAT PRIORITY OF NUISANCE 
IS N·O DEF·ENSE: :.\fAJORITY RULE 
a. IN GENERAL: Actions by individuals 
affected 
While there are a few cases 'vhich support 
a contrary view it has been held or recognized in 
an overwhehning majority of cases that 'vhere 
property is so utilized as to constitute a public 
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or private nuisance, the fact that an individual 
thereafter purchases or occupies property in an 
area affected by the nuisance will not defeat his 
right to its abatement or the recovery of dam-
ages due to its continuance since the fact that th.e· 
complainant 'came to a nuisance' does not consti-
tute a defense or an estoppel nor justify the con-
tinued operation of the· nuisance." 
It would therefore seem that even should the appel-
lants be held to have "moved into a nuisance" that it is 
still no defense. We respectfully suhrnit, however, that 
such was not the case and that the nuisance rnoved to the 
appellants, they having lived there since 1917, some 20 
years prior to respondents' first steps in the business. 
Noise in and of itself rnay be a nuisance. 3.9 Anz. Jur., 
330 Para. 47: 
"Generally, noise is not a nuisance, per se, 
but it may he of such a character as to constitute 
a nuisance in fact, even though it arises from the 
operation of a factory, industrial plant, or other 
lawful business or occupation." (Citing many 
cases in foot note.) 
.A.nd at page 331: 
"Noises which lnJure the health of persons 
residing in the vicinity are regarded as nuisances, 
and so are noises of such character and intensity 
as unreasonably interfere with the comfort and 
enjoyrnent of private property, although no actual 
physical injury to the health of the complaining 
party or his family is shown." 
"No one is entitled to absolute quiet in the 
unjoyment of his property; he may only insist 
upon a degree of quietness consistent with the 
standard of comfort prevailing in the locality in 
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which he dwells. The location and the surround-
ings must be considered, since noise which 
amounts to a nuisance in one locality may be en-
tirely proper in another. The character and mag-
nitude of the industry or business complained of, 
and the manner in \vhich it is conducted must also, 
be taken into consideration, and so must the char-
acter and volume of the noise, the time and dura-
tion of its occurrance, the number of people af-
fected by it, and a:ll the facts and circmnstances 
of the case." 
The time when a noise is made must be taken into 
consideration. 39 Am. Jur., page 334. Par. 51: 
"Time when made. -The time when a noise 
is n1ade is to be taken into consideration in deter-
ruining whether or not it is a nuisance. Thus, 
noises made at night during the usual hours of 
sleep may be a nuisance, although the same or 
greater noises during the day would not be . And 
noises made on Sunday may constitute a nuisance 
although they would not be such if made on \Veek 
day." 
See also J(obielski v. Belle Isle East Side Cream,ery 
Company, 222 :Niich. 656, 193 N.W. 214, 31 A.L.R. 183, 
where the noise of a. crea1r1ery in a residential district at 
night was restrained after giving reasonable time to 
avoid th·e nuisance. 
Fu1nes alone 1nay constitute a nuisance. See 39 .1lnr. 
,Jur., 335, Par. 53: 
"Every person has the right to have the a·ir 
diffus-ed over his premises, \\'"hether located in the 
city or country, in its natural ~tate and free fron1 
artificial in1purities. However, hY air in its nat-
ural state and free from artifici'al i1npurities is 
1neant pure air consistent \Yith tlie locality and 
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character of the community.* * *and any business 
although in itself lawful, which necessarily im-
pregnates large volumes of the atmosphere with 
disagreeable, unwholesome,. or offensive matter, 
may become a nuisance to those occupying adja-
cent property, in case it is so near, and the atmos-
phere is contaminated to such an extent as sub-
stantially to impair the comfort or enjoyment of 
adjacent occupants." 
Page 340, Par. 58 : 
"Noxious fumes, gases, or vapors may consti-
tute an actionable nuisance, although produced in 
carrying on a lawful business, where they result 
in material injury to neighboring property or 
interfere with its com£ ortable use and enjoyment." 
And, Page 341, Par. 58 : 
"As in other cases, the fact that a business 
causing the nuisance is carried on in a careful 
and prudent manner, and that nothing is done by 
those managing it that is not a reasonable and 
necessary incident of it, does not constitute a 
defense." 
The ·casting of light on another's premise·s .may con-
stitute a nuisance. See 5 A.L.R. 2d 706: 
"The private nuisance light cases, considered 
as a whole, seem to warrant the generalization 
that if the intensity of light shining from adjoin-
ing land is strong enough to seriously disturb a 
person of ordinary sensibilities, or interfere "'~ith 
an occupation which is no more than ordinarily 
susceptible to light, it is a nuisance; if not, there 
is no cause of action. The courts will not afford 
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protection to hypersensitive individuals or indus-
tries. This is particularly well brought out in 
Akers v. Marsh (1901) 19 App. D'C 28, infra, Par. 
2, and Amphitheaters, Inc. v. Portland Meadows 
( 1948), Ore., 198 P. 2d 84 7, 5 A.L.R. 2d 690, infra. 
Par. 3." 
And see also the case of Green v. Spinning, Mo., 48 
S W2d 51 at page 711 of the above A.L.R. annotation. 
Further, it has been held that parking lots can easily 
become nuisances beoause of night lighting and the illumi-
.nation fro~ headlights or motor vehicles patronizing 
them. See page 713 of said annotation. 
We have heen assuming, arguendo, that appellants 
are located in an industrial area. We wish it to be re-
Inerribered that we do not subscribe to this idea. The area 
in which appellants live was once entirely agricultural 
and was so when appellants acquired their home. Since 
that time so1ne industry has grown up in and around the 
neighborhood of appellants. This, however, does not give 
respondents or any others the right, in the name of busi-
ness or industry, to preempt the land of residents of long 
standing in the community. 
Due to the fart that the operations were more or less 
li1nited and no night op·erations 'vere carried on and that 
the parties were brothers, appellants 1nade no legal pro-
test prior to 1951. It is contended, ho"rever, that the con-
duct of the business since that time has constituted a nuis-
anee, and it was at about that time that said nuisance 
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began to make itself seriously felt. As in Beja.min v. 
Lietz, (1949), 106 Utah 476, 211 P. 2d 4-d-9, it is the expan-
sion of the business to which appellants object, and to 
the resulting nighttime and Sabbath activity and the an-
noyances which result therefrom. It is contended that in 
the expansion of the business respondents had regard 
only for their own operation and the expediency thereof, 
and they did not regard the rights of the appellants ex-
cept as such rights may have been incidentally affected 
by said expedience. The garage or "shop", as referred 
to in the transcript of proceedings, \vas expanded so that 
it vvas necessary in its use that lights must shine upon 
and into the ho1ne of the appellants, and the trucks and 
engines must n~essarily be driven in areas which are 
closer to appellants' home than is in fact necessary. 
The location of the shop also 1nakes any outdoor work 
carried on more convenient if it is done in an area n1uch 
closer to appellants' hon1e than might otherwise be neces-
sary if the shop were located elsewhere, resulting in the 
bulk of outdoor \vork being done in said area. 1\{uch could 
be done to meet a satisfactory standard of quiet, even if 
it should mean some expense to the respondents. As was 
said in Quinn v. Americwn Spiral Spring arnd. M an.u,fa.c-
turing Co., supra, the defendants should have considered 
these things before they established the various locations 
of their improvements. 
POINT III 
IF THIS COURT SHOULD FIND AN ACTIONABLE 
NUISANCE DOES EXIST BUT FINDS FURTHER THAT 
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APPELLANTS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO EQUITABLE RE-
LIEF IN THE FORM OF AN INJUNCTION IT IS RESPECT-
' FULLY SUBMITTED THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED 
IN REJECTING CERTAIN EVIDENCE AS TO DAMAGES 
AND THE CASE SHOULD BE REMANDED TO THE 
LOWER COURT TO PERMIT A FINDING AS TO THE 
AMO·UNT OF DAMAGES TO WHICH APPELLANTS ARE 
ENTITLED. 
A. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN, AT PAGE 
31 OF THE RECORD, IT SUSTAINED AN OBJEC-
TION T~O A QUESTION PUT BY APPELLANTS' 
OOUNSEL TO APPELLANT GLEN A. HATCH, 
WHICH QUESTION WAS DESIGNATED TO ELICIT 
TESTIMONY RELATIVE TO THE VALUE OF THE 
APPELLANTS' PROPERTY. 
At page 31 of the transcript, counsel for the plain-
tiff asked the plaintiff if he had formed an opinion as to 
the value of the prop·erty he owned as it was now with the 
nuisance continuing at all times. The court sustained an 
objection to the question on the ground that there was 
no foundation laid for an answer from the 'vitness. It 
was then pointed out to the court that the witness "\vas an 
ovvner of the prop·ert~T in question and had been for 
several years. In addition to this jt had been shown that 
he was on the loan co1nn1ittee of a bank in the area and 
th~t he had had occasion to pass upon the values of prop-
erty in the area with the view of lending money to the 
owners and that he had done this \vork for 15 y·ears. In 
addition, he had testified, and it ':vas undisputed, that he 
had lived on the property since 1917 ( R-2). _.'\11 thesP 
facto~s are sufficient to n1ake the plaintiff qualified to 
testify as to the value. 
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It is a rule of law, followed by most of the courts of 
the United States, that an owner, especially one who has 
lived on the property for a number of years, is com-
petent to give testimony as to the value of the property. 
As said in Kinter v. United States, 1946, 172 A.L.R. 232, 
156 F. 2d 5: 
''The owner ·may, because of his personal 
knowledge of the property, the uses to which it 
may be put, the condition of the improvements 
erected thereon, testify as to its market value." 
Many cases may he cited in support of this doctrine, 
some of which will show that Utah subscribes to this doc-
trine. Among said cases are Salt Lake & R. R. Co. v. 
Schramm, 1920, 56 Utah 53, 189 P. 90; Long Beach City 
High School District v. Stewart, 1947, 30 Cal. 2d 763, 185 
P. 2d 585, 173 A.L.R. 249; Spring Valley Waterworks v. 
Drink house, 1891, 92 Cal. 528, 28 P. 681. 
Under this well established doctrine, then, it is shown 
that plaintiff Glen Hatch was entitled to testify as to the 
value of the property in question, and to rule otherwise 
constituted reversible error. 
B. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN, AT PAGE 
70 OF TI-IE RECORD, IT SUSTAINED A l\.fOTION 
TO STRIKE ALL OF THE TESTIMONY OF THE 
APPELLANTS' EXPERT WITNESS LARSON. 
Witness Charles A. Larson was called by the a.ppel-
lants and through questioning testified that his business 
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was that of selling and buying real estate and eon8truct-
ing hornes. He had been in the real estatP business about 
four years and had been constructing homes for 13 or 14 
years on his own account. (R·-47) rJ~hese activjties had 
been almost exclusively confined to the Bountiful area, 
wherein the property in question is located. (R-~8) He 
held at the time of trial a real estate broker's license, 
a city real estate license and a state contractor's license. 
~(R-48) He has sold businesses, farms and ho1nes in the 
area. (R-48) He has sold property in the area of the 
Glen Hatch home about half a mile to the south, and in 
addition receives reports of other sales in the area 
through the Real Estate Board. ( R-56, 57) I-Ie is ac-
quainted with the Glen Hatch home and the general area 
surrounding it, including the industrial developn1ent 
therein. (R-48) He had investigated the area and the said 
Hatch hon1e prior to testifying at the trial. (~49) 
After the above qualifications. of the witness Larson 
were brought out, counsel began to question the witnes~ 
regarding certain n1eas-q.res of damage. The witness 
stated. that he placed a rep~lacement value on app·ellants' 
home, regardless of the location and surroundings, based 
upon a replaeement cost of the hon1e less a consideration 
of age and usage thereof. In other words, it was an esti-
lnate of the rnarket value of appellants' home in a fair 
location, which value was placed at $37,200.00. (R-49, 50) 
Then the witness was asked to place a market valua-
tion upon the appellant's home considering the railroad, 
the· Phillips Petroleum refinery and husinesses the 
' 
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~1itchell garage, the storage and loading racks of the 
Phillips Petroleum Company and other businesses, but 
excluding the W. S. Hatch Company business. The value 
placed by him thereon taking into consideration just 
those circmns tances was $25,000.00. ( R-50 to 53) 
The witness was then asked what value he would 
place upon the appellants' property for residential pur-
poses if there was conducted next to appellants' property 
a business and in the conducting of that business and in 
the maintenance, repairing, cleaning, starting and servic-
ing of trucks, their trucks, semi-trucks and trailers, the 
operators thereof have caused and are causing, both 
day and night, loud and unusual noises, by hamrnering 
\Vi th sledge hammers and other objects upon truck tires 
and other metal objects; in maintaining, repairing and 
changing tires and for other purposes, a good portion 
of this repair work taking place in the building that 
serves as a garage at a distance of about 230 feet fro1n 
the appellants' property and by the cleaning and greasing 
of trucks, cause loud hissing of stean1 and loud and un-
usual noises, by the using of co1npressed air in grease 
guns, and by the starting and testing and warn1ing up of 
motors, and by driving trucks into the area and out, and 
by racing motors, sometimes running then1 for long peri-
ods of tin1e, and by starting of n1otors, and having the 
operation on practically a 24-hour basis where it is run 
night and day, and with lights on the garage building and 
in the area, lighting up the entire area and the back yard 
of the appellants' home, and shining in the \vindo-\vs of 
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the bedroo1n, and the operation of the trucks in thP rPar 
of the business causes furnes to per1neate the appellants' 
liorne, and assuming that this business operation will con-
tinue indefinitely and per1nanently, and that the noises 
created can he heard throughout the appellants' home, 
and that they disturb the sleep and the rest of the occu-
pants. (R-53, 54) The witness placed a value under those 
circumstances of $12,000 or $13,000, ( R-55) and further 
stated that it is hard to say in a situation like that 
vvhether you can find a buyer at any price. (R-56) 
Upon cross-examination the witness was forced hy 
the insistence of the cross-examiner, to give certain valu-
ations vvhich he had not previously considered. But upon 
his basic testimony as to the three different values he 
remained steadfast because those had been based upon 
observation. (R-60 et seq.) He had 1nade a valuation of 
the property vvithout th.e industry about it, then had made 
one with all the industry taken into consideration exclud-
ing the respondents~ premises, and then made a valuation 
taking then1 all into consideration. Respondents contend 
that because he put a particular Yalue upon the damage 
contributed by defendant's property, he should be able 
to do so with every other property in the area. Such is 
not the case unless he is allowed the opportunity to ex-
arnine the area again \Yi th those particular factors in 
rnind, as he had done to prepare hin1self to testify before 
trial -vvith respect to breaking down the effect of the de-
fendants' operations upon plaintiffs' property sepa-
ratelY frorn the others. 
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In Ludlow v. Colorado Anintal By-Products Co. 
( 1943), 104 Utah 221, 137 P. 2d 347, the court clearly 
approves the n1easure of damages which was brought out 
by the questioning of the witnes~ Larson. In that case 
it was said, at page 235 of the Utah Reporter: 
"It appears to be the view of appellant that 
the rule of diminution of market value was not 
properly applied. It is claimed that witnesses for 
plaintiffs made valuations fron1 which they coln-
puted depreciation on so1ne theory of absence of 
the plant structure and \Vithout reference to other 
existing industries, activities and facilities. How-
ever, at least one witness indicated he took into 
consideration the surrounding conditions, and he 
based depreciation solely on the odors emanating 
from defendant's plant. It appears that the trial 
court based depreciation on the frequent recur-
rence of stench, not on any assun1ption that the 
building and other physical structures of appel-
lant as located constituted a nuisance. The find-
ings and conclusions of the court indicate that in 
assessing damages the trial judge used the proper 
criterion-the difference in 111arket value of each 
tract with its i1nproven1ents without the stench 
nuisance existing, as cornpared \vith the value as 
affected by such odors." 
It appears patent upon the face of the record that 
the witness had the requisite qualifications to testify as 
to value. 
2 Jones on Evidence (4th Ed.) 726, Opinions and 
'Conclusions, Sec. 386 states: 
"A witness is qualified to testify to the value 
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of land if he has had an opportunity to forn1 a 
correct opinion as to its value. Testirnony may be 
given by real estate agents, assessors or other 
public officers, or persons who are shown to have 
been engaged in private business of such· a char-
acter as to give the1n speeial or peculiar knovvl-
edge of the subject. Nor is it essential that the 
witness should have bought or sold land in the 
vicinity; his knowledge 1nay have been gained 
by having dealt in sin1ilar property at another 
place. Again it is not necessary th·a t he should 
have known of actual sales of such tracts as the 
one in question, or that his knowledge of sales 
should have been personal, or that it should have 
heen derived from the buyer or seller of the land 
sold. The essentials are: 'First, a knowledge of 
the intrinsic properties of the thing; secondly, a 
knowledge of the state of the market.' and in de-
teTinining the qualifications of a witness, much 
Inust be left to the discretion of the trial judge; 
and this has also been held to be true as to the 
forn1 and adequacy of the questions asked of the 
witness." 
When he attempted to testify as to value it was 
objected that no proper foundation had been laid. The 
court said he would hear the ans"\ver. (R-50, 51) Thence-
forth, Mr. I_jarson's entire testin1ony was heard hy the 
court. 
The essence of Mr. Larson's testimony, as brought 
out by the plaintiff, was to establish· the value of appel-
lants' property as a residence under three different sets 
of facts. First, the value of the prop·erty and home with-
out any industrial surroundings. Second, the value of 
the home and property considering all the industrial 
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develop1nents in the area with the exception of respond-
ents' property. Third, the value of the home and proper-
ty considering all the industrial development in the area. 
In the course of the questioning it was objected that the 
witness had no knowledge of industrial values. Such 
an objection was immaterial because the witness was 
testifying as to the value of residential property only, on 
which he \vas qualified to form an opinion. 
At the close of this testimony, respondents made a 
motion to strike the entire evidence of the witness Larson 
on the grounds that "basically there is no foundation for 
his testimony. That it's so confusing that nobody could 
determine what he rnight mean by values." (R-70) Upon 
inquiry by counsel for the plaintiffs as to what prompted 
the court to grant the motion, the court replied: 
"'1 don't think you have qualified hi1n for 
one thing. I think there isn't a differentiation 
between the W. S. Hatch Cornpany and the other 
industries in that area on -vvhich a value of depre-
ciation could be placed. I'n1 going to grant the 
motion to strike. Yon can take your exception ... " 
(R-70, 71) 
It can be seen thereby that although the court had 
permitted the witness to testify when his qualifications 
\Vere known, he later changed his mind and threw out 
the entire evidence. It is contended tl1at this is gross 
abus of discretion in that the ground for such action was 
an apparent belief, arrived at independently from any 
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testimony in the case, that what the witness said was not 
worthy of belief. Further, the remark quoted was con-
trary to the law cited in the Lud.low case, supra. It "\Vas 
the judge's opinion that such a distinction could not he 
made and, therefore, the testimony should be stricken. 
But the witness was a qualified expert and the judge 
was not. . While there is some discretion allowed the 
judge as to what p·art of a witness' testimony he may be-
lieve, he cannot strike it from the record on the ground 
tliat he does not believe it, because to do so would raise 
his opinion over the rules of evidence and the opinion 
I 
of experts, whieh results the rules were made to prevent. 
It is therefore respectfully contended that the trial 
court erred in granting the motion to strike, that the 
testi1nony should have remained a matter of record, that 
the appellants are entitled to some relief, and that if thi ~ 
court declines to authorize injunctive relief, the case 
should be remanded to the trial court for a new trial to 
determine the amount of damages to which· appellants 
are entitled. 
CONCLUSION 
We have reviewed the facts as found by the trial 
court and we have shown that those facts were either 
unwarranted or were misleading. We have done this by 
referring to the record and analyzing the complete situa-
tion surrounding each particular finding of fact. \\T e 
have· then recommended certain modifications to those 
findings of fact which we respectfully submit should be 
substituted therefor. 
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lT nder thP~e changed findings of fact, \Ve sincerely 
believe that a <·ase of nuisance has lwPn established; that 
the activities of the respondents upon tLeir property 
are unreasonable and unvvarranted in vievv of the condi-
tion of the neighborhood and in vie\v of their neighbors, 
the appellants in this action. \V e believe that thi:-; nuis-
ance is the type for which an injunction should issue, 
if not to ·enjoin the entire business, at least to alter it 
rnaterially to the benefit of the appellants. 
We have shown that there exists an actionable nuis-
ance and should the court believe that no injunctive re-
lief should be had in this particular case, we contend 
that there should he relief in the for111 of darnages and 
that the case should be re1nanded for a hearing of that 
Issue. 
Respectfully submitted, 
()SCAR W. ~'I OYI.JE, ~JR. 
DANIEI-1 T. MOYI.JE 
.HARDIN A. WHITNEY, ,JR .. 
of the firrn of ::vr oYLE & :\f oYLE 
.c!ttorneys for Appellants 
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Receive,d copies of this Brief, this----day of 
-----.....---, 1954. 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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